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1. Significance of new elections 
 
Albeit July 10 new local elections in 14 localities are viewed as quite passive, their 
significance is hard to underestimate. There are several factors worth considering 
when estimating elections' outcome, namely: a) inert voter sympathies; b) "Gagauz 
syndrome"; c) "national consensus"; d) low voter turnout, which increase the ratio of 
the "low mobility voters". Let's consider each of them in greater detail:  
 
a. In the three electoral cycles since independence, local elections were usually 
held one or two years after parliamentary elections and they greatly resembled 
the results as parliamentary ones. This observation is more or less valid for the 
elections of rayon/county councils. The same voter preferences over time are 
due to the fact that both councillors and MPs are elected on party lists. 
Depersonalisation of the candidates on the list also greatly contributes to that, 
they are rather identified with the electoral symbol of the party or its leader. In 
addition, the inertness of electoral sympathies happened at times of relative 
political and socio-economic stability following parliamentary elections.  
 
As for the mayor elections, the overlap with parliamentary elections results is 
much lower. And this because the majoritarian electoral system used for 
mayor elections, besides the rating of the parties also highlights the personal 
qualities of the contestants.  
 
b. One of the most interesting phenomena produced in the recent parliamentary 
elections was the so-called "Gagauz syndrome". This specifically refers to 
significant regress of the Party of Communists' (PC) rating in the Gagauz-Yeri 
region from 80% in 2001 to mere 30% in 2005. A slight regress has been 
registered practically in all the regions heavily populated by national 
minorities (Bulgarians in Taraclia, Ukrainians at the North), including 
Chisinau. Certainly, "Gagauz syndrome" stems from the change in foreign 
policy, in particular worsening relations between Republic of Moldova and 
Russian Federation. However, this factor should not be generalized for the 
entire country, as in Gagauzia it was triggered, among others, by the 
referendum on ousting Gagauz Governor in 2002 and claims of opposition 
harassment.  
 
c. Following March 2005 parliamentary elections, the main event that outraged 
public opinion was "constructive" opposition's support to Voronin re-election 
as the President of the Republic of Moldova. The so-called "constructive 
opposition" argued their decision by the need to consolidate "national 
consensus" in view of European integration and Transdnistrian conflict 
resolution. Still, one of the "national consensus" side-effects was the outburst 
of internal conflicts within the two opposition parties - Social-Liberal Party  
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and Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party, coupled with a negative media 
campaign against the two. This specifically refers to Christian-Democrats who 
designated their own candidate for the Chisinau mayoralty race. Noteworthy, 
the party rating was on the rise, heating 15%, however this time it could drop.  
 
d. The mere fact that elections were scheduled for mid-summer might also 
change the demographics of voter participation. The increased ratio of low-
income voters (those who cannot afford to take a vacation and therefore have a 
low mobility) in the voter turnout, might significantly distort election 
outcome. Previously this factor was considered in greater detail.  
 
The first factor mentioned is a major one, the other three either strengthen or diminish 
it. Expectations of "massive migration" of voters from one candidate to the other 
determined by the "useful vote" or, on the contrary "protest vote" phenomena refer 
specifically to the elections of the Chisinau Mayor and are inspired by the last three 
factors. The first factor should have a major impact in the other 13 localities were new 
elections of the mayors are to be held. From this point of view it is worth examining 
the contestants in those localities as well.  
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Localities 
Whose candidate 
held the position 
before it became 
vacant 
PC MNA CDPP DP PRR SLP SDP RPP LP LUPR EMAV Independents Total 
Chisinau Independent 1   1 1 1       1 1 1 3 10 
Ghidighici, 
Chisinau 
municipality 
SLAMN   1                   2 3 
Chetrosu, 
Anenii Noi 
rayon 
PC 1                     4 5 
Balasinesti, 
Briceni rayon Democratic Party 1     1   1           1 4 
Slobozia-
Sireuti, 
Briceni rayon
PC 1       1   1           3 
Alexandru 
Ioan Cuza, 
Cahul rayon 
SLAMN   1   1               4 6 
Frumoasa, 
Calarasi 
rayon 
PC 1                       1 
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Parcova, 
Edinet rayon Independent  1 1   1               2 5 
Piatra, Orhei 
rayon Independent  1 1   1                 3 
Teleseu, 
Orhei rayon Independent  1           1         1 3 
Zaicani, 
Riscani rayon PC 1 1         1           3 
Vadul-
Rascov, 
Soldanesti 
rayon 
SLAMN 1     1     1         1 4 
Purcari, 
Stefan Voda 
rayon 
SLAMN     1 1   1 1 1       2 7 
Talmaza, 
Stefan Voda 
rayon 
PC     1                 1 2 
Total 
PC - 5 
SLAMN - 4 
DP - 1 
Independents - 4
10 5 3 7 2 2 5 1 1 1 1 21 59 
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Thus, out of the 14 vacancies five were previously hold by Party of Communists' 
representative, 4 by Social-Liberal Alliance "Moldova Noastra" (SLAMN), 1 by 
Christian-Democratic Peoples' Party (CDPP), 4 by independents. Noteworthy, Party 
of Communists designated candidates only in 10 localities, Democratic Party (DP) in 
- 7, Moldova Noastra Alliance - 5, Social-Democratic Party (SDP) 5, Christian-
Democrats - 3, Social-Liberal Party (SLP) - 2, Patria-Rodina-Ravnopravie Bloc - 2, 
Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) - 1, Liberal Party (LP) - 1, Labour Union "Patria-
Rodina" (LUPR) - 1, and Environmental Movement "Alianta Verde" (EMAV) - 1. 
Out of the 59 electoral contestants competing in the race for the mayoralty of 14 
localities, twenty one are independent candidates.  
 
 
2. Candidates running for the Chisinau mayoralty 
 
Supposedly mayor elections are more administrative than political elections, however 
Moldovan political elite gives them a special importance, especially in Chisinau. 
There are plenty of examples when mayors of capital cities made a spectacular 
political carrier. As for Chisinau elections, an indicator of their importance is the 
number and quality of candidates. Among the ten contestants there is one former 
Prime-Minister, an incumbent Minister, three former Ministers, a judge at the 
Supreme Court of Justice and the Constitutional Court, a diplomat. The others also 
boast an impressive resume.  
 
Unfortunately, no opinion polls have been made public. That is why one may only 
speculate on the candidates' chances. To make the rating easier, one might classify the 
contestants into three distinct categories.  
 
a. Candidates designated or supported by parliamentary factions. All the 
four factions represented in Parliament either designated or announced their 
support to a candidate for the Mayor's seat.  
 
Zinaida Greceanii, candidate of the Party of Communists, Minister of 
Finance stands the greatest chances of victory. Albeit not a party member, her 
main advantage is the high rating of the Party of Communists. Still a mention 
should be made that the party rating has been dwindling in Chisinau since 
2001, more than 9% in the last four years. In the 2001 parliamentary elections 
PC garnered in Chisinau - 47.05%; in 2003 municipal elections - 43.74%, 
mayor elections (first round) - 40.7%; 2005 parliamentary elections - 37.97%. 
This trend is a result of "Gagauz syndrome". In 2003 Party of Communists lost 
mayor elections. This year Communist party designated a high professional 
candidate, still in her case the rating of the party and of its leader are 
determining the final outcome. If the voter turnout is as usual around 45%, 
Communist candidate has little chance to win. However if the voter turnout is 
very low, close to one third required for elections validation, then Greacianii 
stands a real chance to win even from the first round. And this because of the 
increased ration of "low-mobility" voters in the voter turnout. If counting on 
the "inertness of the voter preferences" principle, one should take into account 
that in the recent parliamentary elections 128 thousand voters out of 618 
thousand included in the voter rolls cast their ballots in favour of the Party of  
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Communists. For the July 10 elections to be validated about 200 thousand 
voters should come to the polling stations. Consequently, Communist 
candidate stands real chances for a landslide victory, even if "Gagauz 
syndrome" or low turnout steals ? of their votes. At the same time "Gagauz 
syndrome" might be compensated by the vote of the suburbs, including 18 
localities part of the municipality. There are about 85 thousand voters (i.e. 
14% of the total voters) in the suburbs, on top of that as a rule the voter 
turnout there is 10% higher that in the city. In the 2003 local elections it was 
the suburbs that secured the victory of Serafim Urechean. Urechean's 
resignation as a mayor might turn the suburbs to the strongest candidates that 
would promise to solve their problems, especially as the extreme poverty 
qualifies many citizens of suburb as low-mobility voters.  
 
Dumitru Braghis, independent candidate, former Co-chairman of the 
Moldova Noastra Alliance, MP, supported by Moldova Noastra Alliance 
(MNA). Pundits give him great chances of success, at least to get to the second 
round. In 2001 parliamentary elections, while a Prime-Minister he headed 
"Braghis Alliance" Electoral Bloc and won 13.36% nation-wide, while 9.39% 
in Chisinau. In the 2003 elections to the Chisinau municipal council Moldova 
Noastra Social-Liberal Alliance garnered 25.12%. In the recent parliamentary 
elections Moldova Noastra was cast 31% of the votes in Chisinau. His 
personal rating as well as the active campaign he carried out, cast Braghis as 
the non-Communist candidate standing the greatest chances of success. In the 
first round Braghis might win the votes of those who albeit support other 
contestants fear they have no chances - the so-called "useful vote". In addition, 
Braghis might attract some "floating votes" as a result of "Gagauz syndrome". 
In 2003 Serafim Urechean, MNA leader, managed to capture those votes, 
which in fact brought him the much-coveted victory. It is also true that at the 
time, incumbent mayor Urechean enjoyed a very high rating in Chisinau. 
Now, it is important for Braghis to get to the second round when he would 
have a chance to exploit all the factors shaping this campaign, except for "low 
mobility". The latter however is the determining one.  
 
Gheorghe Susarenco, candidate designated by Christian-Democratic People's 
Party, MP in the Christian-Democratic faction, former judge of the Supreme 
Court of Justice and Constitutional Court, former member of the CEC in 1994, 
former Deputy Mayor of Chisinau, not a party member. His work in the 
Constitutional Court and CEC stand as testimony to his professionalism. One 
may estimate Susarenco's rating by judging on Christian-Democrats' rating. In 
the 2003 local elections and 2005 parliamentary ones Christian-Democrats' 
rating in Chisinau was around 15%. Still, in 2003 Christian-Democrat 
candidate Vlad Cubreacov garnered only 8% of the votes. It is believed that 
due to "useful vote" phenomena Urechean snatched many votes from 
Cubreacov. This time the same phenomena might be less important, however 
the "national consensus" might cost them dear. Another factor that might 
affect the performance of the Christian-Democrat candidate is preponderant 
participation of "low-mobility" voters in elections.  
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Vladimir Guritenco, candidate of the Democratic Party, praetor of Botanica 
district of the Chisinau Municipality, former Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare might have in Chisinau a higher rating than that of his party. In the 
2003 Democratic Party garnered 3%. It is very unlikely that the party's rating 
has evolved. Democratic Party ran as part of the Moldova Democrata Bloc 
(MDB) in the 2005 elections and afterwards was severely criticized for 
leaving MDB. His strong point is the good image he has among the residents 
of the Botanica district. It's hard to say whether any of the aforesaid factors 
would have a significant impact on Guritenco's performance in elections.  
 
b. Candidates designated by extra-parliamentary parties and alliances. The 
two candidates in this category are leaders of extra-parliamentary parties 
representing left opposition that heavily criticizes governing party led 
initiatives, especially "national consensus":  
 
Valerii Klimenko, leader of the Social-Political Republican Movement 
"Ravnopravie" is supported by the Socialist Party and Party of Socialists (the 
latter two formed an electoral bloc "Patria-Rodina" in the recent parliamentary 
elections). In the July 10 elections Klimenko would represent Patria-Rodina-
Ravnopravie electoral bloc. He runs for the third time in the Chisinau mayoral 
elections. In 1999 he garnered 4.1%, in 2003 - 1.8%. In the recent 
parliamentary elections his party got 2.83% nation wide and 3.29% in 
Chisinau Municipality. "Patria- Rodina" Bloc was cast 4.97% nation wide and 
4.7% in Chisinau municipality in the recent parliamentary elections. Patria-
Rodina benefited to a large extent from the "Gagauz syndrome" garnering 
51.5% in Gagauz-Yeri in 2005 over only 4.7% in 2001. Klimenko appeals 
mainly to the "national feelings" of the citizens of Russian origin. Given that 
relations between Moldova and Russia continue to worsen, one might well 
expect "Gagauz syndrome" to be on the rise. Noteworthy Klimenko insists he 
is "the only one able to repair and improve relations with Russia". Under 
certain circumstances Klimenko might even get to the second round.  
 
Gheorghe Sima, leader of the Labour Union "Patria-Rodina", former MP, 
former Minister of Education. In the recent parliamentary elections his party 
got 0.92% nationwide and 1.45% in Chisinau.  
 
Both candidates share similar views especially as regards RM integration into 
CIS and single economic space. Besides bringing up administrative issues in 
his campaign both of them contests the principles that laid the ground for the 
"national consensus" between all the parliamentary groups, i.e. European 
integration and "3D" strategy for the Transnistrian conflict resolution.  
 
c. Civic activist candidates  
 
In a way, the other four candidates represent civil society - they are rather 
known as leaders of non-governmental organisations:  
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Iuliana Gorea-Costin independent candidate, Chair of the European 
Association of Political Strategy, diplomat, former RM representative to the 
Council of Europe. Previously Gorea-Costin ran for the presidency in 1996, 
accruing 0.64% nationwide and 0.73% in Chisinau. Her main strong point is 
the way she communicates.  
 
Vladimir Garaba has been designated by the Environmental Party "Alianta 
Verde" (EPAV), Chair of the Chisinau Territorial Organisation of the 
Environmental Movement. In the past elections EPAV ran as part of electoral 
blocs represented in Parliament. Only in 1994 did the party ran separately and 
accrued 0.4%. The party did not take part in the recent parliamentary 
elections. It seems that Garaba's main goal is to highlight environmental 
problems in Chisinau rather than win the race. He does not make populist 
promises rather points to the problems faced by the municipality.  
 
Dorin Chirtoaca has been designated by the Liberal Party (until recently 
Party of Reforms), lawyer, Project Coordinator of the Helsinki Committee for 
Human Rights. The fact that he is the party Deputy Chair of the party does not 
bring any advantages in itself. In the past the party has had a quite modest 
performance: 2.4% in 1994; 0.5% in 1998; 0.7% in 2001. In the 1995 and 
2003 local elections the party ran as part of the largest opposition electoral 
bloc. Therefore, Chirtoaca's main advantage is his personal qualities. TV 
debates set him in a very positive light as he is good in expressing his 
thoughts. Albeit he is the youngest candidate, only 28 years, Chirtoaca seems 
to have been able to prove himself as very knowledgeable of the Chisinau 
problems. There are many signs that Chirtoaca would gather "protest votes" of 
those who have been disappointed by the way democratic parties reached the 
"national consensus" with the ruling party. Mass media promoting the renewal 
of political elite outlined the following scenario for Chirtoaca to enter big 
politics: attracting as many "protest votes" in July 10 elections; converting 
"protest votes" into "conscious votes" and attracting new votes in the 2007 
local elections; attracting "useful votes" in the 2009 parliamentary elections 
and getting into Parliament.  
 
Mihai Severovan, independent candidate, Chair of the Employers' Union in 
Public Services of the RM, independent councillor in the Chisinau Municipal 
Council, probably the most experienced in administration. He was a Deputy 
Minister of Communal Husbandry (1987-1990), Chairperson of the City 
Executive Committee (Chisinau mayor in 1990), Minister of Constructions 
and Territory Planning (1998-1999). In addition, Mihai Severovan has a vast 
experience in politics. In 2001 he ran for Parliament on the lists of the Party of 
Rebirth and Reconciliation, while in 2002 was elected Deputy Chair of the 
Liberal Party's National Council (which merged with Moldova Noastra 
Alliance in 2003). In 2003 Mihai Severovan ran for the mayoralty as an 
independent candidate and garnered 1.3% of the votes.  
 8
Was the "national consensus" rescued? 
Cristian Untila, July 29, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 55, July 4-29, 2005 
 
 
1. Orange evolution quota - 70% 
 
A very strange thing could be outlined during latest debates within sittings of the 
Parliament, broadcasted live on television and radio - the representatives of the Our 
Moldova Alliance faction excel in criticism against actions and drafts of the 
Government. The representatives of the Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD) 
and Democratic Party (PD) demonstrate a more lenient attitude towards drafts 
promoted by the parliamentary majority. This attitude is partly accountable through 
the "national consensus" established at the beginning of activity of the acting 
legislature, as well as due to gradual fulfilment of several conditions imposed by the 
PPCD faction in order to reelect President Voronin.  
 
Thus "national consensus" is the Moldovan alternative to "orange revolution", while 
socio-political developments within the "consensus" framework are perceived as 
"orange evolutions". Following of the fundamental conditions for a "national 
consensus" were fulfilled by the end of the summer session of the Parliament: a) live 
broadcasting of plenary sittings of legislature on radio and television; b) publication 
of records of plenary sittings on the official website of the Parliament; c) agreement of 
the Government to give up quality of founder of newspapers Nezavisimaya Moldova 
and Moldova Suverana; d) modification of the law on Superior Council of 
Magistrates; e) modification of the law on the Chamber of Auditors; f) modification 
of the Election Code; g) modification of the law on the domestic security service SIS.  
 
Under these conditions, the opposition can be sure that persons and functionaries who 
will work in compliance with requirements and criteria regarding depoliticizing of 
law, inspection and security bodies will be promoted to these institutions.  
 
However, the Parliament failed to adopt a new Audiovisual Code, to modify the laws 
on prosecutor's office and local public administration, and these are conditions 
included in the set of initial demands. Even more, the parliamentary majority 
representatives did not want to cede in some very important issues of principle, and 
insisted that the person they have proposed be elected as chairman of the Supreme 
Court of Justice for a new mandate, in spite of protests of PPCD. Thus, only about 70 
percent of opposition's demands were fulfilled. Amendments to the legislation have a 
principle nature and it can be said that the "national consensus" remains in effect for 
the time being, especially after the almost unanimous adoption of the law on key 
provisions of the special juridical statute of settlements on the left bank of the 
Dniester river by the Parliament.  
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2. Law on modification of legislative documents on justice. 
 
The law adopted recently by the Parliament in two readings aims to establish new 
regulations on organisation of justice and regulation of status of judge. Its declared 
goal is to strengthen the independence of judges and autonomy of judiciary system.  
 
Essence of amendments:  
 
a. obligation of the chief of state and Parliament to motivate the refusal to 
appoint the chairman and deputy chairman of courts and courts of appeal or 
the Supreme Court of Justice only from grounded reasons of incompatibility, 
violation of legislation or violation of selection and promotion procedure. If 
the Superior Council of Magistrates proposes again the same candidate after a 
first rejection, the president will have to issue a decree or the Parliament will 
have to pass an appointment decision within 30 days after presentation of the 
repeated proposal. The law says nothing about what would happen if the 
Parliament or chief of state do not issue the necessary decision or decree. The 
regulations in effect do not stipulate any juridical responsibility for the chief of 
state or parliamentarians and it means that this issue is rather reserved for 
politics;  
 
b. obligation of the chief of state to motivate his refusal to name judges of courts 
or courts of appeal or to appoint to offices before expiration of age limit, only 
if he holds cogent evidence of incompatibility of candidate or judge who runs 
this office, violation of legislation or legal procedures of selection and 
promotion of candidate or judge. The law fails to explain the nature of 
incompatibility of a candidate to the judge post, as long as he is not named to 
this post and can run any public or private function, and the incompatibility 
may stop only after appointment to the office of judge. When the Superior 
Council of Magistrates comes with a repeated proposal, the chief of state will 
issue a decree on appointment to the post of judge or appointment to this post 
till expiration of the age limit within 30 days after reception of the repeated 
proposal.  
 
 
3. Amendment of the law on Superior Council of Magistrates. 
 
The law contains two key elements:  
 
a. Modification of mode of constitution of the council. Seven out of 12 members 
of the Superior Council of Magistrates will be elected by the Moldovan 
General Assembly of Judges through secret vote, while the Parliament will 
elect two members among entitled professors - one at the proposal of the 
parliamentary majority and another one at the initiative of the parliamentary 
opposition. The law says that the judges elected by the General Assembly of 
Judges will be temporarily transferred on basis of the rotating principle, by 
three members at once for a one-year period. At present, the Superior Council 
of Magistrates is created the following way: the Supreme Court of Justice 
Plenum elects two judges, the meeting of judges of courts of appeal names 
another two, the meeting of judges of courts appoints two members, and the  
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Parliament names three entitled professors. The Supreme Court of Justice 
head, justice minister and prosecutor-general are members of the Superior 
Council of Magistrates;  
 
b. Status of the General Assembly of Judges. Under the law, the General 
Assembly will ensure the implementation of the principle of self-
administration of judiciary power, holding the exclusive competence to elect 
seven members of the Superior Council of Magistrates. Also, the assembly 
will not be able to pass any other decision on organisation of the judiciary 
power. The assembly will hold a meeting within four years and it will be 
deliberative, if at least 2/3 of the total number of judges attend it, and if there 
is evidence that the judges who do not attend it were announced beforehand 
about this meeting. A new public self-administration body was created indeed 
through these norms, without consulting the judges who will have to ensure its 
activity. Under the effective provisions of the law on the Superior Council of 
Magistrates, this body is an independent body created for organisation and 
functioning of the judiciary system, a guarantee of independence of judiciary 
authority, made up to exert the judiciary self-administration. Respectively, the 
norms which award the right to self-administration to the Superior Council of 
Magistrates and General Assembly will be in situation of conflict. The draft 
has initially proposed that the new members of the Superior Council of 
Magistrates be elected within three months after enforcement of this law, but 
this would affect the mandate of acting members elected for a longer term.  
 
 
4. Law on modification of legislative documents on domestic security service SIS 
 
The amendments awarded new competences to SIS, in particular: a) protection of 
state secret; b) creation, functioning and insurance of security of governmental 
telecommunication systems; c) conduct of anti-terrorism actions.  
 
Also, the SIS was deprived of the right to conduct penal investigations and to hold a 
temporary detention facility. The law did not introduce any regulations on 
demilitarisation of SIS, nor it contains any norms which would serve as base for a 
future lustration law through disclosure of secret agents of the totalitarian regime. 
Also, the law did not introduce any new regulations on limitation of information for 
the "state secret" category, though abuses in this sector had earlier been signalled. 
These amendments had a superficial nature and called indeed only for suppression of 
penal investigations for several offences which rested with the SIS competence.  
 
 
5. Law on modification and completion of the law on Court of Auditors. 
 
The law on the Court of Auditors was completed with a set of norms regarding:  
 
a. the goal of the law is to ensure respect for the mode of creation, administration 
and use of public financial resources; insurance of legal use and in compliance 
with destination, under conditions of saving, efficiency of public estate, etc;  
b. explanation of several notions: thematic control; policies from governing 
programme; control procedures, findings, control tests, etc;  
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c. presentation of a report to the parliament: every year, regarding administration 
of state budget, covering the registered shortcomings as well. The report will 
be examined at a special sitting of the parliament;  
d. principles of financial control activity of the chamber: responsibility; 
objectivity; independence; competence; clear communication; transparency, 
etc. An additional control on administration of financial resources may be 
carried out at the demand of every parliamentary faction, once in a trimester;  
e. the status of the Chamber of Auditors members: 3 members will be elected at 
the initiative of the parliamentary majority, while four members will be 
appointed at the proposal of opposition. Under the law, the chamber members 
will not be recalled from offices, and vacation of their mandate will be 
accepted only in case of dismissal, definitive sentencing under Penal Code, 
expiration of term, from health-related reasons, or if the member turns 65. At 
present, the legislation says that the parliament can recall the chairman and 
members of the Chamber of Auditors from offices before term, if they fail 
their tasks, violate the legislation in effect or commit abusive actions, and if 
most of elected lawmakers vote for such a decision. Thus, lawmakers decided 
to limit the own right to revocation in case of the Chamber of Auditors;  
f. detailing of the mechanism for further controls, at the scene and in its offices, 
and detailing of the mode of issuing of decisions and other documents of the 
Chamber of Auditors.  
 
 
6. Law on modification and completion of the Election Code 
 
The law on modification and completion of the Election Code is part of the most 
important drafts mentioned above and adopted by the Parliament. The draft was 
worked out by a task force created especially to collect proposals of all parliamentary 
factions regarding the improvement of the election system and process, as well as 
initiatives of nongovernmental organisations specialised in this area. The new 
regulations may be grouped as it follows:  
 
a. Explanation of some definitions and notions: appointment of candidates, 
conduct code (between the Central Election Commission (CEC), mass media 
and electoral competitors); domicile and residence;  
b. Limitation of participation of independent candidates in parliamentary 
elections. This law suppressed the possibility of independent candidates to 
participate in parliamentary elections, maintaining only their right to attend the 
local elections. The motivation of such an amendment was that no independent 
candidate was elected as lawmaker since 1994. However, the exaggerate 
electoral threshold of 3-4percent for independent candidates was not taken into 
consideration;  
c. Modification of statute of the Central Election Commission. CEC will be 
made up by nine members: the president of Moldova and the cabinet of 
ministers will appoint by one member, and the Parliament will name another 
seven, including five will be named by opposition parties, in line with their 
number of mandates. The CEC members will be irremovable, but the 
Parliament will hold the right to sack the CEC members. The Supreme Court 
of Justice alone has held this right until now, and the transfer of this right to  
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the politics sector can be hardly described as "improvement and 
democratisation of electoral legislation," and this is rather a step backwards to 
insurance of political control on an independent structure. More than that, a 
norm allowing the Parliament to sack the CEC members if they "gravely 
violate the Constitution of Moldova and the Election Code" was included. The 
law does not explain the grave violations of Constitution and Election Code, 
these being the competences of the Constitutional Court and other courts, as a 
rule. The post of CEC chairman was assimilated to the office of minister, 
while the posts of CEC deputy chairman and secretary to the office of deputy 
minister. Also, the term of mandate of CEC members was reduced from 6 
down to 5 years. Under the law, the CEC members will be appointed within 
three months, so that the mandate of acting CEC members that the Parliament 
named two years ago may be limited this way;  
d. Change of modality of appointment of members of constituency election 
bodies and polling stations. Thus, judges will propose two members of 
constituency councils, local councils of the respective level will name two 
members, while parties and social-political organisations represented in the 
Parliament when these electoral bodies will be created will proportionally 
name the other members entitled to speak and vote. This norm did not provoke 
debates within parliamentary parties, while the opinion of extra-parliamentary 
parties was not even consulted, but many experts fear that conflicts and tense 
situations may occur in future, as this norm may leave room for abuses and 
monopolisation of the political process by several ruling parties;  
e. Explanation and issuing of electoral lists. The local public administration 
authorities will verify the electoral lists every year, updating them at the 
domicile of electors and delivering the information to the CEC by March 1 of 
every year. The elector with domicile and residence will be included in the 
electoral list where he has residence (the problem of how students with 
temporary residence in the settlement where they study will cast their votes 
will be solved this way);  
f. Status of registered candidates. They will receive the necessary medium salary 
from CEC in case of relief from office. Also, the registered candidates will not 
be investigated under the Penal Code, arrested, held or receive administrative 
sanctions without a beforehand agreement of the electoral body which 
registered them, except for flagrant offences, throughout the electoral period. 
The Constitutional Court has considered the last clause within interpretation of 
a similar article from the Election Code, which was excluded later;  
g. Broadcasting of electoral programmes. All analytical, news, entertainment, or 
other programmes envisaging the electoral subjects will be broadcasted under 
generic "Elections" by respecting the CEC concept and regulation." If the 
image of an electoral subject is harmed in other programmes than broadcasted 
under this generic, he will hold the right to reply under the same conditions. 
Also, the public audiovisual institutions have been obliged to organise public 
debates for all electoral contestants under fair conditions. The Election Code 
was completed with a norm, at the initiative of NGOs participating in 
elaboration of this draft, which obliges the mass media to broadcast civic and 
electoral education advertisement at the request of CEC, to hold media 
campaigns to inform electors over procedure of voting and other particularities 
of voting;  
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h. Issuing of ballot paper and voting. Every ballot paper will have a detachable 
coupon containing several elements: - number of ballot paper, type and date of 
elections; name and first name of elector; series and number of his identity 
card, place for control stamp, name and first name of person in charge with 
issuing the ballot paper. The elector will be able to introduce his ballot paper 
in box only after the electoral body member assures over identity of the 
holder, and he will keep all the coupons of ballot papers introduced in the box. 
These innovations besides the "voted" sample applied in annex to the identity 
card may provoke many problems during voting process, as electors are 
unused to such details, and there were cases at the latest scrutinies when voters 
refused to cast their ballots because they did not want the sample to be applied 
in their annexes;  
i. Empowerment of CEC with the right to sanction electoral competitors. Article 
69 of the Election Code was completed with norms which allow the CEC to 
sanction the electoral competitors for violation of the Election Code through a 
warning or fine. Also, unlike contraventions and offences, no violations are 
indicated and thus any breach of the code will be able to bring sanctions. Nor 
who will apply the sanction is established - the entire commission (through its 
decision) or only the CEC chairman (as head), like in case of other sanctioning 
bodies. In the first case, it will be curiously to monitor at the next electoral 
scrutiny how the new CEC members will apply sanctions, as the opposition 
representatives will hold the majority and could obstruct vehemently enough 
the actions of the ruling party representatives;  
j. Modification of electoral threshold. One of the key amendments to the 
Election Code envisages the fact that a four percent electoral threshold will be 
in effect for parties and other social-political organisations participating in 
elections, so that the initial figure established when the 1997 Parliament 
adopted the Election Code was reintroduced. The electoral threshold for 
electoral blocs regardless of the number of subjects which created it was 
unified and established at the level of 8 percent. The electoral threshold for 
blocs made up by two parties is 9 percent and for blocs of minimum three 
parties is 12 percent at present. Thus, the idea of a successive threshold 
introduced in the Election Code in 2000 at the initiative of PPCD was 
maintained on one hand. On the other hand, a recommendation of the Venice 
Commission regarding the introduction of a 3-5 percent threshold for a party 
was fulfilled. It is worth to mention that the norm on electoral threshold was 
discussed the most and it was modified sometimes in dependence of the 
political juncture, on basis of interests of the parliamentary majority. It can be 
said that the amendment this time is also profitable for the majority faction, 
whose rating was shaken at the recent electoral scrutiny through creation of a 
joint bloc of centre-right parties. It was observed when the president was 
elected that small parties are more ready for negotiations and situations like 
what happened on April 4, 2005 could repeat in future.  
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7. Conclusions 
 
Although they are very necessary, these drafts have been worked out and adopted 
under an emergency regime, without deep analyses and without taking into account 
the existing objective realities. No international expertise was undertaken on them, 
while the process of internal coordination with civil society did not have a very 
transparent nature.  
 
Without reducing the cogent value of certain norms, many experts note that the 
findings of a primary analysis of these drafts show that they are very far from the 
initial meaning of appeals and ideas which served as ground to start them.  
 
However, everybody should be content from political point of view: a) the 
"constructive opposition" has got possibilities to promote its staff and enjoys the 
occasion to temperate the criticism of former supporters who neglect it after the first 
had reached a "national consensus" with the ruling party; b) the government 
maintained possibilities for a long time to influence different structures; the envisaged 
structures kept or even deepened their independence.  
 
We will see if these amendments will have a true positive impact on citizens, social 
groups, society in general, and (why not?) on "active opposition" which boycotted the 
reelection of President Voronin, but votes some modifications within the "national 
consensus", if all these changes will contribute to what we call "adjustment of 
national legislation to principles of international legislation in this area."  
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Kazan' CIS Summit 
Igor Botan, September 1, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 56, August 1-31, 2005 
 
 
1. Yet another attempt to revive CIS? 
 
Forecasts on the death of the CIS, or on the contrary, the need for its revival have 
traditionally accompanied any forthcoming CIS Summit. The recent Summit held in 
Kazan' on August 26, 2005 was not an exception to that. As usual, pessimists claim 
that "CIS is more dead than alive", while the optimists claim the opposite. The truth is 
somewhere in the middle, i.e. CIS is in a coma. This explains the numerous initiatives 
to revive CIS, or to eliminate the "necrosis" by promoting differentiated, gradual, or 
even "various speed" integration of certain micro-communities within CIS, such as 
Russia-Belarus Union (RBU); Eurasia Union (EU), Common Economic Space (CES), 
which despite their potential are still quite ephemeral.  
 
And this largely due to the fact that right from the beginning CIS lacked a clear 
strategy. Currently, there is much talk that the greatest merit of CIS was to bring 
"civilized divorce" of the former soviet republics, fact also confirmed recently by 
President Putin. At the beginning things were quite different; however the low 
economic integration potential (despite the dozens of summits and hundreds of 
adopted documents) has brought the general acceptance of this point. In its early 
stages, the most liberal Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev was claiming that 
CIS main purpose was to serve the exclusive interests of Russia, while Russian 
Presidents' Councilor Andranic Migranean went further saying Russia was to promote 
in CIS a strategy similar to Monroe doctrine. Later on, Russian high rank moguls and 
pundits issued a string of statements on the CIS role in preserving Russia's influence 
in the region by means of liberal economic imperialism. A special role in this respect 
was given to the "security belt" made up of secessionist enclaves that were to prevent 
some CIS states from leaving Russia's sphere of influence. In response, CIS countries 
focused on "consolidating their own sovereignty", refrained from any supranational 
structures within CIS, rather accepting only coordination structures in various fields.  
 
The turning point for CIS was the Yalta Summit held in September 2003, when 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan announced the creation of Common 
Economic Space (CES). After the Summit, Russia's strategy as regards CIS became 
quite clear, especially in the three key areas: economy and trade; military and security; 
humanitarian and informational. There is quite clear distinction. Albeit practically all 
CIS countries opt for a close economic cooperation, after the Yalta Summit not all of 
them are eligible for such cooperation. For instance, the first signs of a cool-down 
between Moldova and Russia showed immediately after the Yalta Summit when 
Moldova was not invited into the CES. Only the countries endowed with huge 
economic potential and whose GDP accounted for at least 90% of the CIS' GDP, got 
invited. Among the four founding countries, Russia and Kazakhstan seem to be self-
sufficient economically, largely due to their vast oil and gas reserves. As for Belarus 
and Ukraine, albeit they are the greatest importers of oil and gas, still they have a 
huge economic potential and are economically quite attractive for Russia.  
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Lukashenko's regime remains afloat mainly due to Russia's support, which explains 
his oratorical ardor on Russia-Belarus unification. Ukraine, on the other hand, is 
attractive due to its economic and geopolitical position as well as historic ties with 
Russia.  
 
Russia seems to view economic cooperation and integration without a military 
component, as quite risky for consolidating its influence in CIS. That is why 
membership in the CIS' Agreement on Joint Security (AJS) seems to be one of the 
main criteria when deciding economic policy towards certain CIS countries. This is 
the generally-accepted logic. For instance, former Communist Central European 
countries first joined NATO and only afterwards EU. Out of the CIS countries invited 
to the CES only Ukraine is not a member of AJS, however, as it was mentioned, its 
strategic importance for Russia qualifies it for CES.  
 
The other CIS states having weaker economies and caring about their "sovereignty" 
that are not AJS members could not even aspire to get into CES club. The mere thing 
that keeps them in the CIS is the secessionism "security belt" (Transnistria, Abkhazia 
and South Osetia, Nagornokarabah). Thus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Moldova neither could fully exploit CIS economically, nor could leave it without 
getting into bigger troubles. What some of them could really do is to get into even 
more ephemeral structures than CIS, like GUAM.  
 
Evidence to the new Russia's strategy towards CIS is the statement made by Chair of 
the Foreign Relations Committee of the Federal Assembly, Mikhail Margelov "The 
change in Russia's foreign policy, its pragmatism, has started five years ago", i.e. once 
Putin acceded to power. Yet another illustration is the initial agenda of the Kazani 
Summit, as well as the fact that Ukraine's propositions were neglected. Economic 
issues were only discussed by the heads of the four CES countries. Military 
cooperation issues have been on the agenda of AJS countries, while the leftovers - 
festivities, commemorations, and other general stuff of interest for Russia - where put 
forward on the agenda for discussions by all the heads of state. Those included among 
others: Agreement on Humanitarian Cooperation within CIS; preparations for the 60th 
anniversary of the UN; address to the international community on the 20th 
anniversary of Cernobyl tragedy; fighting terrorism, extremism, trafficking in human 
beings and illegal migration.  
 
Great many pundits were quite critical of the Summit given that only one issue saw 
unanimous support - 20th anniversary of the Cernobyl tragedy. On top of that, 
Turkmenistan announced its withdrawal from CIS, rather opting for the status of 
associated member. Still, one should not exaggerate its implications, for instance 
Ukraine never ratified its adherence to CIS, and is also considered an associated-
member. However, the leaders of Ukraine and Georgia, the main revolutionaries 
within CIS, did praise the summit.  
 
To somehow disguise the CIS deadlock, Russia proposed "reforming and increasing 
the efficiency of the governing bodies" by establishing "an advisory council" to 
include well known public figures. The latter is yet another confirmation to the fact 
that at least for now, CIS is nothing but a discussion club. It also points to the 
transitional character of the Summit in Kazan', which paves the way to really  
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spectacular events impinged by the new political realities within the CIS and 
internationally.  
 
 
2. Context of the CIS Summit 
 
Kazan' Summit happened in a special political context boosting Russia's position in 
the CIS:  
 
a. The problems EU is facing after its 2004 enlargement diminish even further 
the hipotetical accession prospects of the CIS' countries that declared EU 
integration as their top goal. Ukrainian Prime-Minister Yulia Timoshenko 
stated recently that it was not the right moment to knock at EU's doors when it 
was troubled with its own problems. At the same time Kiev administration had 
to refute the statement made by its Minister of Economy, Sergey Terehin on 
Ukraine's withdrawal from CIS. On the contrary, Kiev insists on establishing a 
free-trade zone within SES, of course, without creating any supra-national 
structures. The latter goes counter to Russia and Kazakhstan's intentions to be 
limited only to joint customs and tariff systems.  
b. efforts to avoid any potential "colorful revolutions" push leaders of 
authoritarian CIS states in Russia's arms, including military. Despite certain 
tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan when the latter decided two yeas ago 
to equip its airports with American radar systems and its pressure to dissolve 
AJS headquarters, the military and political integration in the Central Asia is 
taking place, among others via Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The mere 
fact that Russian authorities endorsed Nursultan Nazarbaiev's December re-
election indicate that the differences are much smaller than the danger of a 
"colored revolution". The latest developments in Uzbekistan are also 
illustrative for understanding the regional trends.  
c. despite many problems, Russia's role as EU and US strategic partner is gaining 
grounds, partly due to its vast oil and gas resources, a major factor given the 
instability in the oil exporting regions. Oil has become a crucial factor in 
negotiating not only with CIS, but also with EU. Signing of the Agreement on 
building a natural gas pipeline across the Baltic Sea by President Putin and 
Schroder scheduled for September 8 (ten days prior to general elections in 
Germany) might have a significant impact on election outcomes. Moreover, 
this project raises many problems for Ukraine and Poland's energetic security, 
as it neglects the extension of Odessa - Brody pipeline taking oil from Caspian 
Sea to Poland and further on. In response to Russian-German project, 
Ukrainian authorities intend to rely on coal and uranium. This apparent 
ultimatum comes after Russia announced its intention to raise 2-3 time the 
price on gas, while US was dissatisfied with Ukraine's intention to build a gas 
pipeline from Iran to Ukraine and Europe.  
d. profits from the skyrocketed prices on oil open new opportunities for Russia to 
revive its military and to conduct humanitarian operations in the so-called 
joint informational CIS space. Curiously enough, in some cases Russia 
weights more economic rather than humanitarian benefits. The conflict 
between Russia and Turkmenistan arisen two years ago, when the latter 
decided to cancel the double citizenship for Turkmen citizens. The conflict 
was settled immediately the two countries reached an agreement on the export  
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of Turkmen gas through Russian pipelines. Apparently, the interests of 
Russians residing in Turkmenistan were simply forgotten. Accordingly, as 
long as Turkmenistan exports its gas via Russian pipelines, its withdrawal 
from CIS does not threaten Russia's interests. In return, CIS states importing 
oil have to cope with the consequences of humanitarian programs in the joint 
informational space, i.e. involvement in elections, as was the recent cases of 
Ukraine and Moldova.  
e. "turning into monetary terms" the relations with CIS depending on their 
loyalty to Russia - might prove to be the most powerful lever in Russia's hands 
to wield heavy influence on those countries. Russian officials claim that the 
move is a clear evidence that Russia gave up on its "imperial ambitions". Sure, 
this is a false argument. Pretensions that CIS countries in conflict with Russia 
"should not be sponsored" and have to pay world prices on imported gas, do 
not take into account the damages incurred by the secessionism supported by 
Russia and its troops stationed on the soil of those countries. Anyway, the 
economic and military power remains to be crucial in such kind of disputes.  
 
 
3. Possible consequences for Moldova 
 
President Voronin's participation in the Kazani Summit is in line with his statement 
"Moldova would not become a burier of CIS", meaning that Moldova would not leave 
the structure. The attitude towards the documents put forward for debates resumed to 
"Moldova signs only the documents that do not run counter to the provisions of the 
EU-RM Action Plan". This is a respectable position, however given Ukraine's 
indecisiveness as regards its further integration in CIS, and more importantly, 
regarding securing the border on Transdnistrian portion, Moldova remains somehow 
marginalized. Furthermore, RM incurs huge loses given Russia's ban on fruit and 
vegetable imports from Moldova. An eventual price hike on gas would be yet another 
blow for Moldova. In the long run, those factors might shape the political landscape in 
Moldova, especially revive the pro-CIS opposition.  
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Activity of the Parliament within the first session 
Sergiu Grosu, September 12, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 57, August 31 - September 12, 2005 
 
Lawmakers are expected in late September to return from their two months vacation 
and start the examination of draft laws included in the agenda of the legislature. The 
priorities of the second session (which is the shortest and lasts less than three months) 
have not been established until now, though the executive had drafted a four-year 
activity program and action plans. Also, the Parliament passed a decision last June, 
obliging the executive to submit on September 1, 2005 a list of legislative documents 
which will be drafted in order to implement the governing program and national 
strategies on key sectors, aiming at brining in accordance the national legislation to 
community acquis. It is not clear yet whether the executive has fulfilled the task, nor 
whether envisaged list of legislative documents has been developed and lawmakers 
agenda.  
 
One may only engage in suppositions on the agenda of the next session, however 
what really is feasible is to review the previous session of the legislators elected on 
March 6, 2005 elections when they adopted more than 200 legislative documents.  
 
 
Political and organizational problems  
 
The great majority of spring-summer session focused on political issues and 
settlement of organizational aspects of Parliament activity. Thus, several sessions in a 
row focused on election of the Parliament's administration, members of the permanent 
bureau, parliamentary factions and commissions. Also, the lawmakers debated more 
than once the membership of parliamentary delegations, with representatives of 
different factions expressing contradictory preferences on cooperation at international 
and inter-parliamentary levels. Two sessions of the Parliament focused on election 
and, respectively, investiture of the President, another session was dedicated to 
introduction of the candidate to the Prime-Minister seat and confidence vote to the 
Government. Almost an entire session focused on appointment of the Supreme Court 
of Justice head, while another session was used to name judges and deputy chairmen 
of the Supreme Court of Justice (and only one of them was finally appointed). 
Another session was used to hear the annual report of the Human Rights Center, a 
hearing when Parliamentary opposition voiced harsh criticism. Statements and 
appeals on different topics of interior and foreign policies represented a separate 
issue. Also, the Parliament examined separately the Law on Basic Provisions of the 
Status of the Left Bank of Dniester river.  
 
Parliamentarians paid a special attention to several key sectors, as follows:  
 
Economy, budget and finances  
 
The Parliament adopted a set of amendments shaping the fiscal policy for 2006, 
establishing a small reduction of the income tax, with introduction or simultaneous 
rise of the value-added tax for agriculture. On the one hand, tax-payers salute the  
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reduction of income tax as it may increase the taxable base, reduce the shadow 
economy, but on the other hand it may pose some problems in filling the state coffers. 
Respectively, the rise of VAT in agriculture sector will result in higher prices on 
agricultural products, price-hike also propelled further upwards by the briskly raising 
oil prices.  
 
Representatives of the Government appreciate the amendments made to the state 
budget for 2005 as the first success of this kind in the past ten years, but a closer look 
at the expenditures envisaged by the amendments shows sings of increased spending, 
investments in expensive repairs and reconstructions of administrative, social-cultural, 
entertainment units. Also, budgetary financial investments are almost absent in 
important economic and social sectors [creation of new enterprises, construction of 
housing, crediting youth, building educational and sport institutions, etc].  
 
The amendments to laws which regulate the activity of investment funds aim at 
bringing more transparency and new guarantees for shareholders. On the other hand 
the parliamentary opposition viewed them as an attempt to redistribute property and to 
close up societies which are not of interest to the governors, without ensuring a full 
protection to investors and shareholders.  
 
The new law on leasing was described as an outstanding success, but it gathered a rich 
harvest of criticism and the President did not promulgate it at the very beginning. It is 
very hard to estimate the effects of the new regulation since they are almost absent.  
 
Reformation of some institutions  
 
Under agreements on political partnership, lawmakers dedicated a great deal of time 
to the elaboration and adoption of a set of laws on reforming some institutions and 
their accountability to opposition. (For further details please see the commentary on 
this package of legislative documents published in the July 4-29, 2005 e-journal # 55, 
3rd year)  
 
Education and science  
 
Lawmakers modified the education law in an attempt to bring it in accordance with 
the process of integration in the community area (Bologna Process). Also, the 
deadline set for private educational institutions to comply with legal requirements 
[increase of statutory fund, own premises, adequate technical and didactic 
endowment, etc.] was extended for one year.  
 
The list of professions and specialties taught by higher education institutions was 
adopted through a distinct law. Representatives of the parliamentary opposition 
criticized some of the provisions [but without any result], proposing to grant the right 
to education in medicine sector to private educational institutions as well, since this is 
an internationally recognized practice.  
 
As for science, the Parliament outlined the strategic directions of activity in the area 
of science and innovation till 2010 and adopted a Law on Botanical Gardens, whose 
adoption was preceded by a scandal related to inadequate management of the 
Chisinau municipality Botanical Garden.  
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Agriculture and related sectors  
 
Lawmakers adopted after repeated debates a Law on Organic Agricultural Products, 
whose initial provisions were harshly criticized by the academic and scientific 
environment. Later, the draft proposed by executive was modified, however large 
financial resources will be needed for implementation of the law and the budget did 
not provide for them yet.  
 
Transmission and use of land fields and real estate  
 
The Parliament adopted several legislative documents on statute of state-controlled 
land fields and real estate:  
 
1. Transmission of a building in the town of Vatra to the Justice Ministry for 
urgent sale, in an attempt to recover the losses of depositors of the Intercapital 
concern (Law # 197/XVI).  
2. Inclusion of a block and adjacent plot located in the territory of the 
governmental pension in the village of Holercani, the Dubasari district, in the 
privatization program (Law # 198-XVI).  
3. Withdrawal of 15 hectares of higher quality land from the agricultural circuit 
and the further sale of 12 hectares and building of some objectives which will 
be part of the Wine City enterprise on about 3 hectares (Law # 184-XVI).  
4. Exemption of incomes raised by individuals from sale of agricultural fields 
from taxes with the purpose to transmit them to the railway company of 
Moldova, in order to restore the Revaca-Cainari segment (Law # 73-XVI), and 
others.  
 
Whenever those initiatives were on the Government's agenda, they triggered a storm 
of criticism from the parliamentary opposition, who accused the authorities of 
inefficient management of public resources and attempts to surreptitiously sell the 
state patrimony.  
 
Finally, one may conclude that the key component of the activity of legislature - 
lawmaking - had to suffer; great many of the laws examined were mainly political, 
organisational and formal documents. The conclusion is also based on the fact that out 
of a total of 100 adopted laws:  
 
• more than 20 laws envisage the ratification of some international treaties or 
adhesion to international organisations (formal documents);  
• more than 50 laws are on amending and completing some previous legislative 
documents (the principle of stability of legislation being affected in 
continuation);  
• less than 10 laws are framework laws aimed at establishing new juridical 
relations on areas of social life.  
 
Decisions on settlement of political and organizational problems related to activity of 
the governmental branches represented more than half of the total number of adopted 
documents.  
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Supposedly, the autumn-winter session will be more productive, the following laws 
will be high on legislators' agenda:  
 
• Law on State Budget for 2006;  
• Law on Salaries and Indemnities for dignitaries and other employees in 
budgetary sector;  
• modification of the Law on Local Public Administration and Law on 
Prosecutor's Office (which remained from the package of reforms solicited by 
PPCD), etc.  
 
Also, lawmakers did not start yet the examination of the new Law on the Status of 
Chisinau Municipality, new Law on the Status of Public Officials and evaluation of 
their performances, Law on Central Public Administration, new Law on Cults and 
Law on Political Parties, etc. The public debate (promised by the President) on draft 
Education Code must start soon (only the draft law on higher education was published 
by press). The way those document would be developed and put forward for public 
debates would enable us to judge on the governors' openness and commitment to 
reform.  
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New municipal elections 
Igor Botan, September 26, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 58, September 13-26, 2005 
 
 
1. Timeliness of new elections 
 
The Central Election Commission (CEC) unanimously decided on September 23 to 
convoke new local elections in 10 settlements, including the Chisinau municipality, 
on November 27. CEC passed this decision on an as democratic as possible way, 
taking into account paragraphs (m) and (n) of Article 22 of the Election Code 
regarding "consultation of parties and public organizations" for "plenary participation 
in the electoral process." The CEC sitting was really public, with participation of 
journalists, representatives of political parties and public organizations, as well as of 
the OSCE Mission to Moldova.  
 
Although the CEC decision perfectly fits the international standards, norms of 
Moldova's electoral legislation, rulings of the Constitutional Court regarding election 
of local public administration bodies, there is an impression, however, that this 
decision is inopportune, especially as regards the Chisinau municipality.  
 
International standards particularly envisage the strict need of periodical organization 
of elections. Under Article 1 of the Election Code, the periodicity of elections is 
ensured within mandatory "general elections" of any kind. There are detailed norms 
on terms for organization of "general elections", either parliamentary, or local polls. 
The same detailed norms envisage the establishing of eventual early parliamentary 
elections, which end an old phase and begin a new phase of periodicity of elections 
for the new Parliament elected for a 4-year period. This is a provision of Article 63 of 
Constitution.  
 
As for local elections, the periodicity of elections is ensured by the 4-year mandate of 
local public administration bodies, which begins on the day of "general elections", 
being in effect for the entire community of local councils and mayors in Moldova. 
The Constitutional Court has passed a number of rulings aimed to clarify the way of 
election of local public administration bodies and to establish the strict duration of 
their mandates, after adoption of Moldovan Constitution in 1994 and after the first 
local elections conducted on its basis in 1995. Thus, two rulings of the Constitutional 
Court say that the 4-year mandate of local public administration bodies established 
through Article 119 (1) of the Election Code cannot be shortened or prolonged. 
Another two decisions based on Article 112 of Constitution say that the central 
administration authorities cannot name the local authorities if a mayoral office 
becomes vacant. Even more, the July 30, 2002 notice # 2 of the Constitutional Court 
opposed the intention of a group of 52 lawmakers to modify the Constitution, so that 
to allow local councils to elect mayors indirectly, an intention which perfectly 
complied with the European Chart Autonomous Exercise of Local Power, an 
international document which has priority over internal legislation after the Moldovan 
Parliament ratified it in 1998.  
 24
All the documents envisaged above indicate the need to elect local councils and 
mayors within local "general elections". Article 139 of the Election Code stipulates 
the organization of new election of councils and mayors in case of such a need. As for 
new elections of local councils, there were no major problems the past 10 years. There 
were very few cases of this kind. As regards new mayoral elections, such elections 
take place in 10-25 settlements a year throughout a 4-year mandate. The experience of 
new elections of mayors was satisfactory till the office of Chisinau mayor became 
vacant last spring, and new followed by repeated local elections failed.  
 
Thus, if we speak about legal side of local elections in the Chisinau municipality, we 
observe that it was completely respected throughout current mandate: 1) citizens 
directly elected a mayor of Chisinau for a 4-year period on May 23, 2003; 2) early 
and, respectively, repeated elections took place on July 10 and 24 after the mayor 
elected in 2003 had stepped down, but they remained invalid because of the low 
turnout. Following questions appear under these conditions - how necessary the 
repeated new elections are, can the non-stop organization of new elections be 
avoided?  
The answer may be based on the fact that the vacancy of mayoral office, regardless of 
its cause, always has an element of hazard and therefore the problem to elect the 
mayor must be treated through the opportunity to organize new elections or a deputy 
mayor must be ad-interim mayor. In this regard, before setting the new elections for 
November 27, CEC should call on the Parliament in order to try to persuade 
lawmakers to modify Article 139 of the Election Code, so that no election validation 
threshold of 1/3 participation rate be in effect for new elections or at least to eliminate 
it in case of repeated elections; to ask the legislature to interpret Article 139 of the 
Election Code on basis of Article 66 (c) of Constitution in a move to clarify how 
many times a settlement can organize new local elections throughout a 4 years 
mandate.  
 
a. If the legislature insists on the need to maintain at all costs the 1/3 
participation rate threshold for validation of results of new local elections, this 
way giving them more legitimacy, it would be logical to apply Article 39 of 
the law on local public administration, which says that "a deputy mayor 
becomes mayor if the mayor steps down before term," after an eventual failure 
of new mayoral elections because of the low turnout, till expiration of mandate 
and convocation of local general elections. This approach would be in perfect 
compliance with provisions of Constitutional and electoral legislation of 
Moldova, as well as with Article 3.2 of the European Chart Autonomous 
Exercise of Local Power, which says that self -government "shall be exercised 
by councils or assemblies composed of members freely elected by secret ballot 
on the basis of direct, equal, universal suffrage, and which may possess 
executive organs responsible to them. This provision shall in no way affect 
recourse to assemblies of citizens, referendums or any other form of direct 
citizen participation where it is permitted by statute."  
b. If as many as needed new mayoral elections are to be organized, the barrier 
related to the mandatory participation rate threshold of minimum 1/3 out of the 
number of eligible citizens must be eliminated, at least for repeated elections 
after the failed new elections. This factor obstructed the validation of the July 
10 early elections and July 24 repeated elections in Chisinau.  
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Both approaches would allow us to get rid of "electoral fibrillations" caused by 
eventual failed elections, which have nothing in common with the obligation of 
periodical elections and interest of citizens to have a local administration to protect 
their legitimate interests.  
 
 
2. Interests of political parties 
 
Leaders and representatives of political parties the Liberal Party (PL), Democratic 
Party (PD), Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD), Party of Communists (PC), 
Social Liberal Party (PSL) have favored the establishing of data of new local elections 
in their speeches before CEC passed this decision.  
 
However, attitudes and expectations of political parties regarding the scheduled 
elections, especially in Chisinau, are different. Although the summer period halted the 
participation last summer, the results of the July 10 new elections and July 24 
repeated elections highlighted the rating of candidates of parties in Chisinau. This 
rating also indicates the interests of parties for new elections:  
 
a. The ruling PC can be sure that the rating of its candidate will remain at the 
highest level the next two months till election day, being credited with real 
chances to become winner in the 1st round or runoff vote. This would happen 
in spite of major economic difficulties which follow the rise of fuels prices 
and commercial sanctions introduced by the Russian Federation;  
b. The parties which are members of the so-called "constructive opposition" 
(PPCD, PC, PSL) gave green light to establishing of election day without 
much enthusiasm. It is more important for them to pressure the ruling party to 
fulfill its obligations within "national consensus" in order to register concrete 
accomplishments by the May 2007 local "general elections" than to spend 
financial and organizational resources in order to understand one more time 
that their rating is lower than usually. In this regard, the solution proposed by 
PPCD chairman Iurie Rosca at a televised program on PRO TV channel to let 
the municipal council confirm the ad-interim mayor can be understood. It is 
true that he did not specify that such a solution is proposed only for cases 
registered after the failure of new elections;  
c. The active opposition represented by Our Moldova Alliance seems to be 
interested the most in organization of new elections in Chisinau. AMN leader 
Serafim Urechean said after the failure of new and repeated elections last 
summer that he will bid for the mayor post. He has recently stated that "the 
idea of the PPCD leader to deprive the electorate of the right to elect mayors is 
a continuation of the communist anti-reform and a deviation from principles of 
European democracy." The interventions of Serafim Urechean against PCRM 
seem to be inspired. Permanent blaming of Moldova by the European Court of 
Human Rights continues on the western front. Russia's commercial sanctions 
against Moldova are on the eastern front. However, the participation of 
Serafim Urechean in the municipal elections in Chisinau is very risky. He 
must only win for eventuality to participate in the municipal elections in 
Chisinau. However, Urechean's resignation from the mayoral office last April 
with the declared goal "to promote the interests of citizens in the Parliament at 
national level," followed by change of this intention with only half a year later,  
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in order to come back to the Chisinau City Hall may lay serious obstacles on 
his way. He will have to give financial explanations as well - why millions of 
lei should be wasted because of him, public money, for these maneuvers of 
resignation-comeback to the Chisinau City Hall? Citizens may wonder 
whether an eventual victory of Serafim Urechean would mean the start of a 
new phase of the "cold war" between him and President Voronin.  
d. Parties with low rating are interested to participate in a new political show in 
order to keep the attention of voters.  
 
These interests of political parties also highlight the problem of timeliness to hold 
new elections in the Chisinau municipality. Also, there are other problems regarding 
timeliness to organize elections:  
 
a. under amendments to the Election Code approved last July, preparations for 
the November 27 elections will take place during reformation of electoral 
bodies and CEC, and this contravenes the good practices recommended by the 
Venice Commission to avoid an essential change of rules during the electoral 
process;  
b. the Chisinau electorate may demonstrate tiredness and reticence over new 
elections after being convoked four times for voting in only 9 months 
(parliamentary elections on March 6; early local elections on July 10; repeated 
local election on July 24; new local elections on November 27). An eventual 
electoral activism of people who did not attend the elections last summer 
because of vacation could be combated by passivity of persons who voted in 
vain.  
c. some potential strong candidates may decide not to participate in the new 
elections because an eventual victory may rather harm their political career. 
Truly, does it make any sense for a strong opposition candidate to win the 
municipal elections with one year and half before general elections, on the eve 
of winter, which seems to be very difficult from energy point of view, without 
any certainty to enjoy the support and understanding of the municipal council?  
 
All these causes taken together may have a negative impact on motivation of citizens 
to participate in elections.  
 
 
3. What should voters do? 
 
It may be supposed that electors in the Chisinau municipality are tired of invitations to 
cast their votes four times in only 9 months. However, they have nothing to do but to 
accept this situation and to use their constitutional right and obligation of citizen to 
cast their ballots. The best solution to the electoral tiredness is to make the Chisinau 
residents read or read again the extraordinary literary works of known writers Mihail 
Saltikov-Scedrin and Iaroslaw Gasec - "The Story of a City" and, respectively, 
"Municipal Elections" in the new electoral period. Thus, the special pleasure is to 
persuade that "all is old and all is new", that means the present problems of the 
Chisinau municipality and their approach by politicians during electoral campaign are 
very similar to the ones faced by other cities from other meridians almost 100 years 
ago (and even more).  
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Noisy start of parliamentary session 
Sergiu Grosu, October 11, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 59, September 27 - October 12, 2005 
 
The parliament started the second annual session on October 6 after a vacation of 
more than two months. The long break of plenary sittings marked the lawmakers who 
had earlier actively participated in debates and hour of the government. Indeed, the 
parliamentary opposition representatives have started an offensive from the very 
beginning, mainly against executive and its institutions. Of neither course, nor bitter 
accusations against parliamentary majority and government in general were absent. 
Statements in this regard and appeals voiced by lawmakers at the first sitting 
envisaged the situation in agriculture sector. In addition, social-political, education, 
and health-related problems were tackled. Several of discussed drafts were received 
with reticence from the very beginning, before their detailed examination and hearing 
of stance of parliamentary commissions, so that those who refused first to support the 
proposals accepted them later, motivating the initial stance through an arden state of 
spirit or lack of detailed explanations. The last objection was generated by insufficient 
quality of materials promoted by executive.  
 
The parliamentary majority turned down the proposals of representatives of the 
Alliance Our Moldova to include in agenda several draft laws aimed to improve the 
legislative framework on taxation of agriculture and to maintain the facilitary VAT 
for some categories of goods. Also, no exact term when the executive must report on 
its activity and measures aimed at improvement of situation of farmers were 
established so far.  
 
The ardent debates at the opening sitting were preceded by an introducing speech of 
speaker, who reviewed the accomplishments of the precedent session and outlined 
tasks for the autumn-winter session. He indicated among others the following 
priorities of parliamentary activity:  
 
• elaboration of a legislative programme till 2009 and a programme on 
examination of drafts examined by the Council of Europe;  
• organisation of parliamentary hearings on key national programmes 
(Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, governing 
programme, the European Union-Moldova Action Plan);  
• promotion of parliamentary diplomacy in some key directions (cooperation 
with the E.U.; cooperation with the Russian Federation; strengthening of 
neighborhood relations; collaboration with the Baltics for elaboration of 
mechanism for adjustment of national legislation to community laws);  
• elaboration and implementation of the concept on cooperation between 
legislature and civil society in a short term.  
 
Lawmakers examined draft documents in one hour in the two days of opening sittings, 
spending the rest of time on tries to vote the withdrawal of immunity from certain 
opposition parliamentarians, questions, appeals, statements and ardent dialogues 
between representatives of opposition and parliamentary majority.  
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Decision for modification of the regulation on use of money from the agriculture 
sustenance fund. The decision establishes the possibility to award budgetary 
subsidies to businesses working in agriculture sector which took credits from 
commercial banks or different loan associations in 2001-04 and did not reimburse 
them in the due time or failed to pay all interests. The regulation says that agricultural 
producers who fulfil these obligations till December 31, 2005 can benefit from 
budgetary subsidies.  
 
The regulation on awarding of subsidies establishes that producers who took credits 
can receive subsidies of maximum 125,000 lei in line with a special formula. As much 
as 30 million lei was allocated from the budget for this purpose. The adoption of this 
document was preceded by a negative stance of opposition representatives who 
invoked first the lack of information and insufficient transparency related to awarding 
of these subsidies. Most of lawmakers voted for adoption of this decision after 
receiving supplementary explanations and learning that the specialised commission 
has got a list with 140 debtor businesses, accepting to award subsidies of about 1.5 
million lei to debtor enterprises.  
 
Law on importation of an automobile. The importation of a specialised medical 
automobile (mobile machine for burning) manufactured in 1989 for needs of the 
traumatology hospital in Chisinau, without any right to sell it later, is allowed as 
exception through derogation from provisions of the November 20, 1197 law # 1380-
XIII on customs duty.  
 
It was said during talks that these modalities of promotion of imports by lawmakers as 
exceptions indicate some lobby trends and such drafts must come exclusively from 
the cabinet of ministers, which has possibilities and resources needed for an adequate 
examination of the problem and determination of the need to derogate from the 
organic law on customs duty.  
 
We note in this regard that the parliament has already adopted 15 derogation laws in 
2001-05 since introduction of interdiction against imports of cars older than 10 years, 
which allowed the importation of more than 35 vehicles for different destinations 
(medicine, power networks, firefighters, penitentiaries, etc.), older than established by 
law. According to competent specialists, the technical condition of automobiles 
imported on exceptional ways was not always satisfactory, while some of them unfit 
the necessary ecological requirements.  
 
Starting 2006, the authorities plan to ban the importation of automobiles older than 7 
years and this will increase the prices on auto market and will probably encourage a 
higher number of legislative documents adopted as exceptions for different public and 
social needs, but not for private needs.  
 
Law for completion of Article 38 of the law on acquisition of goods, works and 
services for needs of the state. Under the law that the parliament passed in two 
readings at once, certain facilitary legislative conditions will be created for enterprises 
of Moldovan associations of blind, disabled and deaf people. Thus, the law on 
acquisitions (# 1166-XIII from April 30, 1997) includes regulations which allow 
working groups for acquisitions to apply a preferential margin of maximum 15 
percent for goods, works and services of these enterprises while evaluating and  
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comparing the offers. Respectively, if these goods (service, work) will be produced by 
another domestic or foreign business and will cost by 15 percent less, public 
acquisition institutions will be allowed to choose the more expensive goods, assisting 
the economic activity of disabled people this way.  
 
The official motivation of these modifications is the need to support these enterprises, 
which raised very large debts and are not competitive because they spend large 
amounts to arrange and create special work conditions for disabled people. These 
enterprises are exempted from a series of state taxes and fees every year, being 
awarded other facilities as well, which do not settle however all the problems related 
to their activity.  
 
Draft law for modification and completion of the law on prevention and combat 
of money laundering and financing of terrorism. The draft adopted in the first 
reading stipulates the possibility to receive electronic reports and to create an 
electronic database on suspect deals and other types of bank transactions, which fall 
under incidence of the law on combat of money laundering (# 633-XV from 
November 15, 2001). Also, it proposes the liberalisation of control on transactions 
carried out by non-residents through bank cards issued in Moldova, while foreign 
competent bodies will have the possibility to control them in compliance with 
interstate agreements and other international documents on this sector. The declared 
goal of the last modifications its o attract foreign investments in Moldova and to 
improve the investment image of the country this way.  
 
To outline in this regard that Moldovan president has told a recent forum with 
participation of local businessmen that the high interests on credits of Moldovan 
commercial banks do not encourage the economy and the authorities will find ways to 
invite foreign financial institutions to come with cheaper crediting sources, if the 
situation does not improve.  
 
The law on combat of money laundering was approved at the recommendation of 
international organisations and it calls among other measures for issuing of special 
kits by financial institutions for any operation of individual worth more than 300,000 
lei (23,800 dollars) and for any operation of business worth more than 500,000 lei 
(39,700 dollars), and to deliver these kits to the Centre for the Struggle Against 
Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCCEC) which can check the deals selectively or 
methodically.  
 
The adoption of this law has provoked negative reactions from bank community and 
businessmen at the very beginning, fearing that it is too restrictive and does not 
encourage investments. The increase of the minimum share of operations for control 
was proposed later, but the parliament turned down this proposal. Although the law is 
in effect for four years, no detailed statistics on illegal sums whose legalisation was 
combated or discovered by CCCEC are available so far.  
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Declarations on internal policy 
 
The parliamentary factions representing the Alliance Our Moldova (AMN) and 
Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD) spoke out about policy of the executive 
at the end of the October 6 sitting. AMN contested the situation of agriculture, 
invoking as shortcomings the forced consolidation of fields, compromising of exports 
of agricultural production to Russia, acquisition of cereals for lower prices, limitation 
of exports of cereals through Commodity Exchange, etc. The government was urged 
to exempt farmers from land tax and contributions to the State Social Fund, to prolong 
the validity term of the 5-percent VAT for phytotechny and horticulture production 
till 2011, to create a cereals intervention fund, to compensate higher prices of oil 
products, etc.  
 
PPCD invoked the difficult situation of agriculture and the failure of reforms in 
healthcare and education sectors. According to Christian Democrats, the current 
situation may compromise the executive and parliament and, therefore, the legislature 
must efficiently fulfil its control function, soliciting the cabinet of ministers to take 
some adequate measures and to hear information at public sittings.  
 
The parliamentary majority turned down a proposal to discuss draft laws on tackled 
issues immediately and the speaker introduced the problem regarding withdrawal of 
juridical immunity from several lawmakers, at the request of prosecutor-general, as 
exception in agenda at the beginning of the October 7 sitting, in order to distort the 
attention of opposition and public opinion from such topics. The motivation of the 
urgent examination was the presentation of a report on this topic by the juridical 
commission for appointments and immunities, a report that the parliament is to accept 
or turn down the request within seven days after presentation in line with legislation 
in effect. The violation of the legal procedure, which says that the decision indicating 
grounded reasons to approve the request of the prosecutor-general is adopted with the 
vote of "at least half plus one of its members" (Article 10, Paragraph 2 of the law 
on status of parliamentarian) demonstrates that the competent commission was 
"hurried up" to unveil the report, and this situation provoked controversial talks at 
plenary sitting. The same article of the law says that the juridical commission for 
appointments and immunities must establish the existence of some grounded reasons 
for approval of the request of prosecutor-general "within maximum 15 days" after 
its reception from speaker. Taking into account the fact that the prosecutor's office 
tabled its request in early summer, the legal term for its examination has expired and 
the prosecutor-general must submit a new request.  
 
The creation of the voting commission and secret voting for withdrawal of immunity 
was postponed for October 13 and we could observe the reaction of specialised 
international organisations in this regard till this date for sure. The recent resolution 
1465 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urges the 
Moldovan authorities to review the regulations and status of lawmaker which allow 
the loss of immunity for political reasons, as well as to reexamine reasons of penal 
investigation against opposition leaders at central and local levels.  
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Parliamentary Imunodeficitar Syndrome 
Sergiu Grosu, October 25, 2005  
 
Democracy and governing in Moldova 
e-journal, III year, no. 60, October 12-25, 2005 
 
The Communist majority faction, with the votes of 54 lawmakers, gave green light on 
October 13 to requests of prosecutor-general to try a group of deputies who represent 
the opposition faction of the Alliance Our Moldova (AMN), including leader Serafim 
Urechean, under Penal Code.  
 
The voting was preceded by a plenary sitting with arden debates, with prosecutor-
general being in situation of his clients and invoking the so-called "secret of 
investigation" more than once, when he was questioned in details. Also before voting, 
the majority faction of the Party of Moldovan Communists (PCRM) was left alone 
and all other parliamentary political parties publicly refused to cast their votes, a 
situation which was not registered in the parliament after March 6, 2005, when the 
acting governmental team received the trust vote of only 56 Communist lawmakers. 
The opposition representatives, except for AMN, unanimously recommended their 
accused colleagues "to openly go to the court in order to demonstrate their innocence 
there," rather than justified their actions.  
 
The talks in the parliament outlined juridical aspects of mandate of lawmakers besides 
political problems, raising talks on immunities and inviolabilities awarded to deputies 
and other categories of public functionaries. On this occasion, some lawmakers 
recalled the idea to annul or to essentially limit the parliamentary immunity, while 
others invited colleagues to forget the slogans from electoral campaigns and to 
cooperate for deeper and better guarantees needed for promotion of political 
pluralism, by revising the legislation on functioning of prosecutor's office and courts.  
 
We remind in the context that there were many tries at the precedent session of the 
parliament to promote the candidacy of Serafim Urechean to the Moldovan delegation 
to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), tries generated by 
tactical reasons and probably by fact that the status of lawmaker who is a PACE 
member awards international immunity that can be limited more hardly than the 
national immunity. Perhaps the failure of these tries and political developments at 
local level made the AMN leader say that he refuses the parliamentary immunity and 
complies with procedures of law enforcement bodies aimed to demonstrate his illegal 
actions.  
 
This is a political statement without any juridical nature, since the immunity is a 
public law category in the modern constitutional acceptation, an imperative of 
mandate of parliamentarian, not a personal privilege which can be refused for a 
period. The immunity is effective throughout mandate of lawmaker and if the 
immunity is ceded, the mandate of deputy is given up, too, and there are many 
examples in this regard, even in neighboring countries.  
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This statement is effective for these cases despite of the fact that constitutional norms 
of Articles 70-71 protect lawmakers above all from persecutions against votes or 
opinions expressed during mandate, while the penal investigation vs. AMN 
representatives started before they have obtained the mandates of parliamentarians. It 
is important to mention here the mode of activity of prosecutor's office bodies which 
understand the "reasonable terms" of the Code of Penal Procedure in a special 
manner. Thus, the delivery of the case filed in late 2004 for "one illegal action" to the 
court was preceded by parliamentary elections, and the defendants received immunity 
then; by election of the chief of state, investiture of the cabinet of ministers, and 
resignation of Serafim Urechean from the post of mayor general of the Chisinau 
municipality.  
 
These events altogether make the impression of some political pressures on AMN, 
and an ad-hoc TV survey carried out within a programme with the participation of 
Serafim Urechean confirmed this fact. This impression can be also based on 
withdrawal of immunity from AMN parliamentarians. The majority parliamentary 
faction took this action after the failed try to elect a new mayor of Chisinau last 
summer and before the new mayoral elections scheduled for late November.  
 
Meanwhile, a series of not very good events for the Moldovan authorities took place: 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) sentenced Moldova in case of another 
functionary of the Chisinau City Hall for holding him contrary to international 
legislation and norms; the PACE has recently passed a resolution on functioning of 
democratic institutions in Moldova, with a series of serious recommendations. The 
issue regarding examination of requests of the prosecutor-general seeking the trying 
of some lawmakers under Penal Code was included in agenda of the parliament as 
exception and with derogations from regulations in the area, with only two days after 
appearance of the PACE Resolution.  
 
The normal question appearing here is why does the parliamentary majority need such 
talks and conflicts with political opponents from the so-called "active opposition" 
namely now? Why does it take such steps when the "national political consensus" 
seems to function, when European institutions and namely PACE salutes the 
accomplishments within this consensus, when PACE urges the Moldovan authorities 
to review regularities and provisions of the status of lawmaker which allow the loss of 
immunity for political reasons, as well as to reexamine the reasons of penal 
investigation vs. opposition leaders? More than that, the governance representatives 
know very well that European institutions pay an increased attention to aspects related 
to immunity of parliamentarians in monitored countries, and these institutions had 
earlier demanded explanations from the Chisinau authorities regarding the respect for 
democratic principles in the area.  
 
The answer seems to be clear. First, the started work must be finished; this way the 
political and selective nature of penal investigation is recognised. Second, the recent 
PACE report on functioning of democratic institutions in Moldova indicates the 
independence of justice and its institutions, corruption among big problems. The 
withdrawal of immunity from AMN lawmakers may be regarded through this 
viewpoint, and authorities may say that they fight against corruption this way. 
However, the final can be different, depending on quality of evidence collected by 
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prosecutor's office in the case vs. Serafim Urechean. If the accusation is weak and its 
evidence envisages only the single episode related to purchase of ambulances, the  
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court may award victory to the former mayor-general, the justice would triumph and 
government would get through this situation by invoking eventually the fact that the 
Moldovan justice has tested its independence while the prosecutor's office must be 
reformed the way the "constructive opposition" demands.  
 
However, the questions mentioned above may also comprise other components of the 
answer - the next PACE resolution on Moldova could appear after half a year and it is 
unknown how the majority and "constructive opposition" will cooperate then, 
especially when the last clauses of the April 4, 2005 agreement will be fulfilled the 
next several months (while the civil law rule says that "the sides return to the previous 
situation when the contract expires"). Respectively, the ruling party could be 
interested to return to the situation registered before April 4 but under new 
circumstances, when the two oppositions hate and accuse each other, while the leader 
of the "active opposition" is harassed, and this thing is nothing but a reproach against 
"constructive opposition", which failed a satisfactory result for an adequate treatment 
from law enforcement bodies for an opposition leader within the understanding with 
opposition, not only for those who hold an agreement with the governance.  
 
As regards the relations between the two oppositions and their capacity of self-
defense, it is worth to mention that leaders of the Christian Democratic People's Party 
(PPCD) knew how to resist to assaults on their immunity in the precedent legislature. 
The seven decisions of the parliament concerning the preliminary consent for trying 
on penal or conventional cause in 2001-2004 had no effects on viability of this 
political force. It is true that they had to handle a different situation, as the 
prosecutor's office filed the cases when they were lawmakers, so that it was easier to 
demonstrate the connection between votes and opinions and persecution. Anyway, the 
PPCD demonstrated that it does not suffer from parliamentary AIDS. AMN should 
demonstrate soon that it has enough forces to protect its immunity.  
 
However, games with giving up parliamentary immunity must stop. It is well-known 
that there are tendencies to limit the immunity in countries with authentic democratic 
regimes, especially of parliamentary immunity, since inviolability often leads to 
irresponsibility. Limitation or annulment of immunity may have grave effects in 
countries which are part of the so-called "new democracies", where the lack of an 
independent and strongly consolidated juridical system is visible. Even more, 
common citizens may have a favorable perception of reduction of parliamentary 
immunity, so that it would be very hard to stop this process once it starts.  
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